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SPURNED PARTNER OR OLD ACQUAINTANCE?
In the law library I have at home, there are about a dozen textbooks on public international law. I thought it would be a good idea to start my research into the relationship between public and private international law by looking up 'private international law' in the index helpfully provided in each of those books. The result was rather disheartening. Obviously, the topic of 'private international law', or 'PIL', or 'conflict of laws', or 'conflicts law', or 'transnational law' is of no concern to scholars of public international law. Only one of them has seen fit to write a few pages on the difference between them. 1 By contrast, I have not been able to find a single textbook on private international law in my library in which public international law is not included in the index. If there is a genuine partnership between the two disciplines, one of the partners does not seem to be much interested in the other.
Yet, there are symptoms of mutual interest as well: perhaps not an interest in each other, but still a common interest in legal issues arising in an international setting, whether they involve public entities or private parties. This is proved by the existence of legal periodicals (such as the Netherlands International Law Review) and legal societies (such as the Netherlands Society of International Law), in which 'international law' stands for both public and private international law. The Institut de droit international, the International Law Association and the Hague Academy of International Law were founded to further the study and development of 'international law, both public and private '. 2 In legal education, on the other hand, there is a marked distinction between the two disciplines. In most countries, these days, a full professorship in (public) international law does not require any expertise in private international law, and vice versa. Many holders of the chair of private international law do teach comparative law, or some topic of substantive private law, but the combination 2. Cf. the ILA Constitution (as adopted at the 71st conference, 1971), Art. 3.1: 'The objectives of the Association are the study, clarification and development of international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect for international law.' In its Constitution, the Institut does not distinguish between public and private international law, but in view of both its membership and the many resolutions it adopted on topics of private international law its purpose 'to promote the progress of international law' is not limited to public international law. The objectives of the Hague Academy are evidenced by its summer courses on both public and private international law. NILR 2010 of public and private international law is fairly uncommon.
3 When my own law school reorganized its departments in the 1990s, it was decided that the chairs of European law, public international law, private international law and the law of international organizations would merge into one 'Department of international law'. Our first joint venture was a new course for first-year students, in which we focused on various types of international legal relationships and the ways they can be regulated. In this conception of 'international law', it was crucial to follow a few basic threads running through the whole of our subject-matter. One of them was sovereignty, another one was found in the modalities of international concord: coexistence, coordination, cooperation and integration. Unfortunately, the course was discontinued when the transition to the bachelor/master model of higher education necessitated a new curriculum. Soon afterwards, it was thought that private international law did not quite fit in with a department which is genetically oriented towards public law. So, we moved in with the Department of private law, even if our involvement with substantive private law is hardly stronger than our affinity with the disciplines united under the banner of 'international law'.
To me, this experience is an apt illustration of the bumpy relationship between public and private international law. There have been times when the predominant academic view held that private international law has its roots in what was known as the law of nations. In the twentieth century most scholars rejected this idea. To them, public and private international law are two independent disciplines, the latter in no way subordinate to the former: private international law is basically national law, unaffected by international precepts. Recently, however, some authors have proved themselves receptive to the suggestion that public and private international law are gradually merging into one discipline, or that there are at least some areas of common ground between them. 4 The centennial of the Netherlands Society of International Law provides a welcome opportunity to examine the merits of such propositions.
Looking to the past may help us to understand the present and, perhaps, to say something about the future. That is why I should like to sketch the relationship between public and private international law first in its historical context 3. In Germany, Wilhelm Wengler is said to be the last holder of a chair of both public and private international law: S. Leible and M. Ruffert, 'Einführung', in S. Leible 7. To Rodenburg, the extraterritorial effect of statuta personalia follows from 'their very nature and legal necessity' ('ipsa rei natura ac necessitas'), Tractatus, supra n. 6, Tit. 1, C. 3, no. 4. Since Johannes Voet -who denied any legal obligation to take account of foreign lawtook issue with Rodenburg's proposition, it is highly unlikely that the term necessitas should be understood as necessitas facti (practical necessity) instead of necessitas juris (legal necessity), as Meyers, supra n. 5, p. 666, asserted. Cf. Kollewijn, supra n. 5, pp. 64 et seq.; Scholten, supra n. 5, pp. 60 et seq. (Paris, Librairie Cotillon 1888) . To Kollewijn, the true founding father no legal obligation to take account of foreign proceedings, of foreign law, or of foreign judgments. Their courts might refuse to assume jurisdiction where the same action was already pending abroad, in some cases they might apply foreign law, and they might even allow the enforcement of foreign judgments, but only on the ground of indulgence: ex comitate rather than de iure.
2.2
The bond of comity: Huber and Story
Comitas proved to be an elusive concept. In 1684, the Frisian scholar Ulricus Huber set out three axioms on the spatial reach of substantive laws, two of which confirm the principle of territorial jurisdiction: state law does not extend beyond national borders. 11 The third axiom, however, opens up an avenue for the consideration of foreign law: 'the rulers of every state admit that the laws of each people in force within its own boundaries should retain their force everywhere, insofar as they do not prejudice the power or rights of another state or its citizens '. 12 States are prepared to do so, according to Huber, because they are willing (1686) . The first axiom lays down the principle of territorial sovereignty: 'Prima fit, leges cujusque reipublicae tenent obligantque cunctos eidem imperio subjectos, nec ultra' (De jure civitatis); 'Leges cujusque imperii vim habent intra terminus ejusdem Reipublicae omnesque ei subjectos obligant, nec ultra' (Praelectiones); 'dat de wetten van yder vry landschap kracht moeten hebben binnen de palen des selven landts, ende verbinden alle de onderdanen des selfs, sonder wyders' (Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt). An English translation of the Praelectiones version can be found in: A. Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, A Case Study in Conflict of Laws (Athens, The University of Georgia Press 1992) p. 4: 'The laws of each sovereign authority have force within the boundaries of its state, and bind all subject to it, but not beyond. ' The second maxim extends the concept of 'subjects' to any person who happens to be within a state's boundaries: 'Secunda, pro subjectis habentur quicunque in territorio cujusque civitatis reperiuntur, quamdiu illic commorantur …' (De jure civitatis); 'Pro subjectis imperio habendi sunt omnes, qui intra terminus ejusdem reperiuntur, sive in perpetuum, sive ad tempus ibi commorentur' (Praelectiones); 'dat voor onderdanen moeten worden gehouden alle personen, die in dat landschap worden bevonden, soo lange sy hun aldaer onthouden, het sy voor een tyt ofte voor altoos' (Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt). In Watson's translation: 'Those people are held to be subject to a sovereign authority who are found within its boundaries, whether they are there permanently or temporarily.'
12. 'Tertia, summae potestates cujusque reipublicae indulgent sibi mutuo, ut jura legesque aliarum in aliarum territoriis effectum habeant, quatenus sine praejudicio indulgentium fieri potest' (De jure civitatis); 'Rectores imperiorum id comiter agunt, ut jura cujusque populi intra terminus ejus exercita, teneant ubique suam vim, quatenus nihil potestati aut juri alterius imperantis ejusque civium praejudicetur' (Praelectiones); 'de hooge machten van yder landt bieden elckander de NILR 2010 to 'offer one another a helping hand ', 13 or to 'mutually indulge each other ', 14 or to 'act out of comity'. 15 While these expressions could be understood as variations on the theme of sovereign magnanimity, in line with the position taken by Paulus and Johannes Voet, Huber advocated the view that sovereign states have a legal obligation to take account of foreign law. 16 Its effect should be recognized on the ground of jus gentium secundarium, which is -in Huber's view -compounded of rules accepted by all nations and binding by virtue of natural law.
17 Remarkably absent in this line of reasoning is any evidence of the postulated consensus communis populorum, which might explain Huber's additional reference to the precepts of natural law.
18 It is clear, however, that his third axiom is meant to express a principle of international law: sovereign states have a legal duty to accept the authority of foreign law insofar as it already applied to those subject to it. Huber's conflicts theory is based on the premise that, on the ground of jus gentium, the authority of a state over its citizens abroad should be accepted by other states, and, consequently, that rights vested under the law of one state should be recognized everywhere else. His point of departure, however, is the relation between sovereign states rather than between private parties. That is why he classified conflicts law as public rather than private law, and as part of international rather than domestic law. 19 handt ten einde de rechten van yder op elk syn onderdanen, schoon elders synde, soo verre gelden, als het niet strydig met de macht of het recht van des anderen in syn bedryf' ( Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt).
13. 17. In its reliance on natural law, Huber's conception of jus gentium is ambivalent. According to Grotius, the binding force of jus gentium is based on international consent only ('jus gentium est quod gentium omnium aut multarum voluntate vim obligandi accepit': De jure belli ac pacis, I, I, para. 14). Huber, confusingly, slips in a reference to the ratio recta: 'quod ex voluntate popularum, recta ratione utentium vim obligandi accepit [emphasis added]': Praelectiones, Pars I, Liber I, Titulus II, no. 1.
18. Cf. Kollewijn supra n. 5, pp. 137 et seq.; Scholten, supra n. 5, p. 71. 19. De jure civitatis, Liber III, Sectio IV, Cap. I, 14: 'Exempla quibus utemur, ad juris privati species maxime quidem pertinebunt, sed judicium de illis unice juris publici rationibus constat, atque exinde definiri debent' ('Most of the examples we use will belong to private law but their treatment rests exclusively on public law reasoning, and they must be defined accordingly'). Praelec tiones, Pars II, Liber I, Titulus III, 1: 'Quamquam ipsa quaestio magis ad jus gentium quam ad jus civili pertineat, quatenus quid diversi populi inter se servare debeant, ad juris gentium rationes pertinere manifestum est' ('While the question itself belongs to jus gentium rather than jus civile, it is clear that the reasons why different nations in their mutual relations are bound to observe certain rules belong to jus gentium'). NILR 2010 From the beginning of the eighteenth century, Huber's authority, while barely acknowledged by his Dutch contemporaries, came to dominate Anglo-American conflicts jurisprudence, 20 culminating in the explicit endorsement of his theory by Joseph Story, the founding father of American conflicts law. It is one of the ironies of legal history that Story greatly contributed to Huber's fame by mis representing his theory. 21 While Huber had argued that -on the basis of international consent and natural law -states have a legal obligation to take account of foreign law, Story took his cue from what he thought to be Huber's key concept: 'comity'. Citing Boullenois, Rodenburg, Paulus Voet and Huber, he arrived at the conclusion that '[Huber's] doctrine owes its origin and authority to the voluntary adoption and consent of nations. It is therefore in the strictest sense a matter of the comity of nations, not of absolute paramount obligation, superseding all discretion on the subject.'
22 Even though this view is more in line with the teachings of Paulus and Johannes Voet, Huber was henceforth considered as the inventor of a doctrine that supports 'the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation'. 
2.3
An emerging community of nations: Savigny
Whether comity is understood as implying a legal or a moral duty, as something in between absolute obligation and mere courtesy, as a choice-of-law principle or as a rule of public international law, 24 the doctrine seems to be flexible enough 20. Cf. Watson, supra n. 11, pp. 48 et seq., referring to a Scottish case decided in 1713, in which Huber was cited with approval. His authority was acknowledged in several conflicts cases decided by Lord Mansfield, chief justice of the King's Bench between 1756 and 1788, which contributed to Huber's pre-eminence in Anglo-American conflicts jurisprudence.
21. Cf. Watson, supra n. 11, p. viii: 'One purpose of this book is to show that Story misunderstood the views of Huber on comity; that earlier cases in England and the United States had already accepted Huber; and that subsequent important cases based on Story would have been decided differently if Huber had been followed. Indeed, on Huber's theory the Dred Scott case, with all its consequences, could not have arisen.' Contra: J.R. Paul, 'The Transformation of International Comity ', 71 Law and Contemporary Problems (2008) pp. 19-38, fn. 26 and accompanying text: 'Watson disagrees with the conventional interpretation of Huber. He insists that Huber "does not allow for free discretion applying foreign law"'; W.S. Dodge, 'International Comity in International Courts', <www.asil.org/files/dodge.pdf>, fnn. 53-55 and accompanying text: 'With all due respect to Watson, it takes a certain chutzpah to argue that one has a better understanding of what comity really means than Mansfield, Kent, and Story.' The author is probably not aware that a number of Dutch scholars (supra n. 16) have proved convincingly that Huber's conception of comity does not allow for free discretion; to Story, on the other hand, comity does not give rise to any obligation to give effect to foreign law. It takes a certain 'chutzpah', I think, to berate Watson for bringing this conflict to light. 24. Cf. Akehurst/Malanczuk (7th edn.), supra n. 1, p. 73: 'Its literal meaning is "courtesy", and in this sense comity is regarded as something different from law of any sort; rules of comity to support diametrically opposed views on the nature of conflicts law. On the one hand, it is based on the premise that states have no legal obligation to give effect to foreign law. They are basically free to decide on which grounds their courts will take account of the laws of other states. In this respect, comity supports the view that conflicts law is national law, free from any international compulsion. On the other hand, comity requires more than mere courtesy. Since an absolute ban on foreign law could be detrimental both to international relations and to the rights of the parties concerned, states have a mutual obligation to allow its application in some cases, in the interest of justice.
25 If this aspect is emphasized, comity supports an internationalist conflicts theory, calling for universal choiceof-law rules and -thus -closing the gap between public and private international law.
For more than a century -roughly between 1850 and 1950 -the two schools of thought dominated the doctrinal debate. In Europe, the most prominent internationalists were Savigny and Mancini. Citing Huber, Voet and Story, Savigny postulated that an equal treatment of domestic and foreign law 'is dictated by the common interest of nations and of individuals'. 26 However, his approach to the choice-of-law problem does not seek to strike a balance between sovereign authority and benevolent indulgence. Instead, conflicts law should first of all be geared to the needs of the international community: '[W]e must be convinced that the leading principle of modern legislation and practice does not consist in the jealous maintenance of its own exclusive authority; nay, that there is rather a tendency to the promotion of a true community of law, and therefore to the treatment of cases of conflict according to the essence and requirements of each legal relation, without respect to the limits of states and the territory of their laws.' 27 are customs which are normally followed but which are not legally obligatory. At other times it is used as a synonym for private international law; as a synonym for public international law; or as a totally meaningless expression. It is a wonderful word to use when one wants to blur the distinction between public and private international law, or to avoid clarity of thought.' 25. Cf. Story, supra n. 22, p. 34: 'The true foundation, on which the administration of justice must rest, is that the rules, which are to govern, are those, which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences, which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return [emphasis added].' 26. F.C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Band VIII (Berlin, Veit 1849) § 348, pp. 26-27: 'Dahin führt die wünschenswerthe Gegenseitigkeit in der Behandlung der Rechtsverhältnisse, und die daraus hervorgehende Gleichheit in der Behandlung der Einheimischen und Fremden, die im Ganzen und Großen durch den Gemeinsamen Vortheil der Völker und der Einzelnen geboten wird.' I have copied the English translation from W. Guthrie, A treatise on the conflict of laws and the limits of their operation in respect of place and time by Friedrich Carl von Savigny (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clarke Law Publishers 1869) at p. 27: 'This has resulted from that reciprocity in dealing with cases which is so desirable, and the consequent equality in judging between natives and foreigners, which, on the whole, is dictated by the common interest of nations and of individuals.' 27. Ibid., § 361, p. 128: 'Wenn wir nun die oben angeregte Frage unbefangen erwägen, so müssen wir uns überzeugen, daß der vorherrschende Gesichtpunkt der neueren Gesetzgebung und Praxis nicht in der eifersüchtigen Handhabung der ausschließenden eigenen Herrschaft besteht, ja NILR 2010 Savigny's conflicts theory is based on the assumption that there is a community of nations subject to an 'international common law ', 28 to which he referred as both the 'foundation and highest aim of our whole doctrine'. 29 Still, even if the application of foreign law may ultimately be required by international law, Savigny carefully refrained from saying that such a legal duty already existed. While he anticipated the development of a branch of international law dealing with conflicts cases, states should continue to conclude treaties on issues of conflicts law: as expressions of the law of the international community, they would help to achieve its general recognition. 28. Ibid., § 348, p. 27: 'Der Standpunkt, auf den wir durch diese Erwägung geführt werden, ist der einer völkerrechtlichen Gemeinschaft der mit einander verkehrenden Nationen …' Probably quite in tune with Savigny's meaning, Guthrie (ibid., p. 27) translated the expression 'völkerrecht-liche Gemeinschaft' into 'international common law': 'The standpoint to which this consideration leads us, is that of an international common law of nations having intercourse with one another …' 29. Ibid., § 360, p. 117: '… Grundlage und letztes Ziel unsrer ganzen Lehre'; Guthrie, supra n. 26, p. 94.
30. Ibid., § 348, pp. 30-31: 'Die hier aufgestellten Grundsätze über die mögliche, wünschens-werthe, zu erwartende völkerrechtliche Gemeinschaft in der Behandlung der Collisionen örtlicher Rechte können eine besondere Förderung erhalten, wenn über diesen Gegenstand … Staatsverträge geschlossen werden. … Vielmehr sind sie fast immer als der Ausdruck der oben dargelegten allgemeinen Rechtsgemeinschaft anzusehen, mithin als Versuche, diese Rechtsgemeinschaft stets vollständiger zur Anerkennung zu bringen.' Guthrie, ibid., p. 30: 'The principles I have laid down as to the possibility and the advantages of a common system of rules dealing with conflicts between territorial laws, are very greatly promoted by public treaties. … They are rather, in almost every case, to be regarded as the expression of the community of legal feeling explained above, and therefore as attempts to make it more clearly apprehended. Cours (1982) pp. 39-49; idem, supra n. 3, pp. 23-41. implies that the rights acquired by an alien under his own law should be recognized everywhere. Thus, personal status, capacity and family relationships are governed by the law of the state to which a person belongs. 33 Although this multilateral conflicts rule is meant to resolve issues of private international law, it is rooted in public international law, as it is derived from the principle of nondiscrimination. To Mancini, therefore, the application of foreign law could not be based on Story's comity, or on Savigny's 'freundliche Zulassung': such notions contradict the fact that foreigners have 'rights that stem from the source of human nature, which is higher and purer than the concessions of governments'. 34 Thus, states have an obligation to recognize those rights, a duty that has its roots in the 'natural and necessary laws of man'. 35 On this ideological basis, Mancini built a system of conflicts law hinging on a distinction between diritto privato necessario (family law and succession, subject to the principle of nationality, or nazionalità), diritto privato volontario (contractual obligations, subject to the principle of party autonomy, or libertà) and rules pertaining to the ordine pubblico (addressing issues of public interest, subject to the principle of territoriality, or sovranità).
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The notion that private international law addresses issues of legislative and judicial authority, that no state can independently dictate the extraterritorial reach of its own law or restrict the applicability of foreign law, and that conflicts of law should therefore be solved by supranational rules, was accepted by the great majority of conflicts scholars in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. They all recognized that conflicts law had its foundation in 'a veritable law binding the member states of the community of nations', 37 and each of them proposed a solution that was meant to be universal and geared towards an international coordination of sovereign powers.
38 Conflicts law, they taught, was meant to 33. Art. 6 of the Italian Civil Code of 1865: 'Lo stato e la capacità delle persone, ed i rapporti di famiglia, sono regolati dalla legge della nazione a cui esse appartengono.' 34. P.S. Mancini, in a speech delivered in 1852 at the University of Turin, reprinted in part in Jayme (1980), supra n. 32, pp. 54 et seq.: '… ciò non permette di riporre nella concessione voluntaria de' governi l'origine esclusiva di tutt'i diritti che già abbondevolmente emanano dalla più alta e pura sorgente dell 'umana 39 This was fertile ground for a concerted effort to present public and private international law as offshoots from the same stem. Covering both topics, 'international law' replaced 'the law of nations' as an academic field. The Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, set up in 1869 by Rolin-Jaequemyns, Asser and Westlake, was intended as a platform for all lawyers moved by l'esprit d'internationalité and interested in 'the progressive nature of European civilization'. The Institut de Droit International, established in 1873, aspired 'to promote the progress of international law, by applying itself to becoming a medium of the legal conscience of the civilized world'. 40 In the same year, the 'Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations' (which changed its name to 'International Law Association' in 1895) was founded in Brussels. Despite its name, the Association did not focus on public international law alone, as is demonstrated by its earliest projects. One of those concerned the need for a treaty on the recognition of foreign judgments.
41 A call for a diplomatic conference on that topic was eventually answered by the Dutch government, convening the first session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1893.
2.5
Going separate ways
With the advent of the new century, the international spirit that characterized the development of public and private international in Europe in the final quarter rechercher dans quelle mesure les droits qui appartiennent à tout homme, même en dehors du territoire de sa patrie, sont compatibles avec ceux de l'Etat sur le sol duquel il en demande l'exercice, dans quelle mesure la souveraineté personnelle de la loi étrangère peut être conciliée avec la souveraineté de la loi locale.' 40. Art. 1 of the Institute's Constitution: 'Il a pour but de favoriser le progrès du droit international, en s'efforçant de devenir l'organe de la conscience juridique du monde civilisé.' There is no specific reference to private international law in the Constitution, or in the report on the founding session in Ghent in 1873 (Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International (1877) p. 11). Yet, considering the background of some of the Institute's founding fathers (notably Asser and Mancini), there can be no doubt that private international law was included in the general term 'international law'. One of the committees instituted during the first session was supposed to study the viability of treaties 'ensuring a uniform resolution of conflicts between differing civil and criminal laws'. Mancini was to report on civil law, Asser on civil procedure, Goldschmidt on commercial law, and Brocher on criminal law.
41. The recognition of foreign judgments was discussed by the Association's members at the Milan meeting in 1883. A diplomatic conference was planned and organized by Mancini, but had to be cancelled on account of an epidemic in northern Italy. See: K.H. Nadelmann, 'Mancini's Nationality Rule and Non-Unified Legal Systems -Nationality and Domicile', in Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate, Selected Essays by Kurt H. Nadelmann (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1972) pp. 49-84 at p. 70. Another early project in the sphere of private law focused on the law of general average. One of the earliest versions of the York Antwerp Rules was adopted at the Association's Antwerp meeting in 1877. NILR 2010 of the nineteenth century quickly faded away. On the one hand, the idea of a supranational order based on vague notions of a community of civilized nations could neither be squared with a positivist definition of law (as espoused by Von Jhering and Jellinek) nor with the upcoming trend of sociological jurisprudence (Gény in France, Kantorowicz and Ehrlich in Germany), in which the sociological reality of law does not have its basis in a community of nations but in each individual state. 42 On the other hand, the Great War of 1914-1918 shattered any belief in the influence of European civilization on the progressive development of international law. Post-war resentment fostered nationalist feelings, and the disillusionment with the unifying capacity of international law put its underlying ideology in doubt. The internationalist approach was found to be 'politically naïve and methodologically amateurish', couched in 'the language of natural law in a slightly modernised form'.
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These developments caused a rift between public and private international law. The shift from idealism to realism compelled conflicts theorists to face the fact that the rules of their discipline were anything but universal, which implies that each state must have its own conception of conflicts law. States may be bound by a few supranational principles indicating the limits of their legislative and judicial jurisdiction in this field, 44 but as long as they are prepared to take account, somehow, of the international aspects of private law relationships, they are free to determine the extent of their international good will. This nationalist conception of private international law soon became the dominant view. Franz Kahn was probably the first to challenge the dogmas of Mancini's Italian school, followed by a host of writers in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. 45 In France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, the nationalist movement had equally strong support. 46 In England and the United States, where the notion of a universal system of conflicts law had never been popular, several authors expressly rejected the internationalist view. 47 42. Cf. Koskenniemi, supra n. 38, p. 39. 43. Ibid., p. 25, p. 31. 44. It could be argued that public international law prohibits a categorical refusal to apply foreign law in conflicts cases, and that it does not allow the discrimination of foreigners in their relations with a state's nationals or residents. Such principles are not only too vague to define the extent of a state's legal obligation, but they are also without any practical import, as no state has ever been accused of contravening them.
45. Living apart together Today, no conflicts scholar of note would suggest that public and private international law are branches of the same tree. Contemporary conflicts theory does not hold that the choice between lex fori and foreign law is dictated by universal rules or principles. States are still deemed to be completely free to enact their own rules of jurisdiction, choice of law, or recognition and enforcement -subject, of course, to federal restraints or supranational limitations. 48 That is not to say, however, that public and private international law have nothing more in common than the internationality of their subject-matter. The old dichotomies between public law and private law, and between national law and international law, are gradually fading. Conflicts law is not exclusively concerned with international relationships between private parties. Traditionally, it also addresses public law issues, such as sovereign immunity or the extraterritorial reach of public law, and in that respect it contributes to the law of international coexistence. More recently, international judicial cooperation has become an increasingly important branch of private international law, as attested to by international agreements on the transmission of judicial and extrajudicial documents, taking evidence abroad, the legalization of public documents, child abduction, adoption, the recovery of child support, etcetera.
49 Furthermore, it can hardly be maintained that the primary source of modern conflicts law is national law. The Member States of the European Union are increasingly bound by regulations in this field, and their freedom to enter into international agreements on private international law has been drastically curbed. 50 Apart from the ongoing communitarization of conflicts law, there are other processes at work, which tend to confirm a trend towards 48. As may be expressed in the constitution of a federal system, and, respectively, in European Community law. See: Mills, supra n. Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member State no longer has the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules.' In its Opinion of 7 February 2006, no. 1/03, on the competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, ECR 2006, I-1145 (the so-called Lugano opinion), the Court reached the conclusion that the renewed Lugano Convention does touch on the existing EC rules on those topics (the 'Brussels I Regulation'), which implies that the competence to conclude the convention is exclusive to the Community and is not shared with the Member States. integration also on an international level. Globalization has helped to break down national borders and sovereign authority, thus creating a climate which is favorable to the unification of both private international law and substantive private law. The growing body of international economic law not only affects the relations between states, but those between private parties as well. The protection of human rights is another branch of public international law which has a direct impact on the resolution of conflicts cases. All in all, public and private international law have much more in common than their separate treatment in textbooks and classrooms suggests. To me, however, there is one trait of conflicts law that, more than any other of the factors just mentioned, confirms its kinship with international law. Conflicts law may be national law, but, on a comparative basis, its rules are surprisingly universal.
3.
A UNIVERSAL OUTLOOK
As we have seen, Friedrich Carl von Savigny based his choice-of-law theory on 'a tendency to the promotion of a true community of law', 51 which implied 'in its full development, not only that in each particular state the foreigner is not postponed to the native (in which equality in the treatment of persons consists), but also that, in cases of conflict of laws, the same legal relations (cases) have to expect the same decision, whether the judgment be pronounced in this state or in that'. 52 On this premise, he built a universal system of conflicts law, taking as his point of departure the (necessarily universal) nature of legal relationships and their geographical 'seat'. Despite the cardinal flaw in his reasoning -the nature of a legal relationship cannot be translated into a localizing criterion -Savigny's views on the need to achieve uniform decisions were universally accepted, as were the main tenets of his method: it turns on the geographical seat of a legal relationship, it is blind to the contents of substantive law, and it has no bias for or against any of the eligible laws.
Even after the decline of the internationalist movement in the first decades of the twentieth century, the development of conflicts law in most countries was still dominated by universalist ideals. Decisional harmony continued to be viewed as the strongest motive for maintaining a system of blind and neutral choice-of-law rules. This advice was taken most literally by the author of the Uniform Benelux Law on Private International Law, E.M. Meijers, professing that 'statutory rules of private international law should be drafted in such a way that they would fit into a world law'. 55 The notion that conflicts rules should be universally acceptable ties in nicely with the assumption that private international law is primarily concerned with an impartial 'coordination of legal systems ', 56 which implies that all states involved would agree on the applicability of one and the same national law. Similarly, the proposition that conflicts law is meant to promote some kind of global 'conflicts justice', 57 rather than justice in the individual case, suggests 165-190. 57. The thesis that conflicts law is only concerned with 'conflicts justice' (internationalprivatrechtliche Gerechtigkeit), not with 'substantive justice' (materiellrechtliche Gerechtigkeit), was originally defended by G. Kegel, 'Begriffs-und Interessenjurisprudenz im internationalen NILR 2010 that its rules are derived from universal principles. Necessarily, those rules must be blind to the contents of the eligible laws and their underlying policies, and indifferent to their national origins.
3.1
Converging trends: party autonomy, escape clauses, the diminishing role of nationality Until the 1960s, there was little debate on these points of departure, even if the courts occasionally felt obliged to stretch the limits of some general doctrines -such as characterization, public policy or renvoi -to overcome the rigidity of traditional choice of law. 58 The changes that followed may have seemed radical at the time but, actually, most of them only confirmed the universal aspirations that had characterized the development of conflicts law since Savigny and Mancini. In the final decades of the twentieth century some degree of consensus was reached on three controversial issues, all of which posed a threat to the achievement of decisional harmony.
The first issue related to the principle of party autonomy: should private parties have a right to designate the applicable law themselves? Those opposing such liberty argued that freedom of choice would allow the parties to place themselves 'above the law' and, thus, to avoid the mandatory rules of the law that would apply on objective grounds. 59 Eventually, the 'anti-autonomists' lost the battle. It is now generally accepted that freedom of choice is not an original prerogative of the parties, but a right embodied in, and conditioned by, the forum's conflicts law. Where there used to be uncertainty as to the validity of choice-oflaw clauses, the widespread acceptance of the principle of party autonomy -at least in the area of contracts -has helped to achieve uniformity of result, a development quite in tune with universalist ideals.
The same could be said about the introduction of flexible choice-of-law rules. Much of the criticism levelled at traditional conflicts law can be traced back to the unhappy results it achieved in a-typical cases, in which the facts point to a closer geographical connection than the one designated by an abstract connecting Privatrecht', in Festschrift Hans Lewald (Basel, Verlag Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1953) factor. Remedies have come in various forms. The most effective one, in my opinion, is a general exception allowing the displacement of the law designated by an abstract connecting factor, in favor of the law of the country with which the case, in view of all circumstances, is actually most closely connected. 60 Another solution is found in sub-rules, anticipating a particular a-typical situation, such as the case in which a tort has been committed in a country other than the one in which both parties are domiciled.
61 Obviously, such provisions are meant to correct the inaccuracies in the determination of the closest geographical connection inherent in any abstract connecting factor. In that respect, they support the universalist ideals of system coordination and the achievement of 'conflicts justice'.
Another issue that has lost most of its former poignancy focused on the disharmony between states embracing the nationality principle in matters of family law and those adhering to a domiciliary nexus. Ironically, the rift was caused by Mancini's universalist conception of choice-of-law, which would be furthered, in his view, by the endorsement of 'nationality as the basis of international law '. 62 This new tenet was soon to be adopted by most civil law countries. Its success was corroborated by the first Hague Conventions on family law, which exclusively referred to the lex patriae.
63 However, since both Scandinavia and the common law nations continued to support the domiciliary principle, all universalist aspirations were doomed, at least in the area of family law. Yet, the great divide between nationality and domicile is gradually becoming smaller. In postwar Hague Conventions, a domiciliary connection has either displaced the nationality principle altogether, or it takes pride of place in a set of rules and exceptions 60. Cf. Art. 4(4) Rome I Regulation: 'Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.' See also: Rome II Regulation, Arts. 4(3), 5(2), 10(4), 11(4), 12 (2) The provision first refers to the law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected (section 1), presumed to be the law of the country where the party carrying out the characteristic performance has his habitual residence or principal place of business (section 2). The presumption is subject to an exception 'if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country' (section 5).
61. Cf. Art. 4(2) Rome II Regulation: 'Where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining the damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply', displacing the lex loci damni to which Art. 4(1) refers. See also: Arts. 10(2), 11(2), 12(2)(b) Rome II Regulation.
62. This was the title of his inaugural lecture at the University of Turin in 1851, supra n. 31. 63. Specifically: Convention du 12 juin 1902 pour régler les conflits de lois en matière de mariage; Convention du 12 juin 1902 pour régler les conflits de lois et de juridictions en matière de divorce et de séparation de corps; Convention du 12 juin 1902 pour régler la tutelle des mineurs; Convention du 17 juillet 1905 concernant les conflits de lois relatives aux effets du mariage sur les droits et les devoirs des époux dans leurs rapports personnels et sur les biens des époux. NILR 2010 meant to take the sting out of the nationality-domicile contest. 64 A similar trend can be seen in recent continental European codifications, where nationality no longer reigns supreme. 65 Furthermore, many national systems of private international law have adopted standards to test the relevance of a person's citizenship as a localizing factor. If that person happens to be a refugee, or a national of more than one country, or a citizen of a country where different systems of law apply, habitual residence (or a combination of habitual residence and nationality) may prove to be a more suitable or workable connecting factor than nationality as such. 66 The domiciliary trend inherent in these tests is only reinforced by general exceptions allowing a correction to the initial choice of law where it is clear that the case is more closely connected with another country. Here, too, the development of private international law is moving towards an accord between positions that were once irreconcilable.
64. The Hague Convention on child protection of 1961 refers primarily to the state of the child's habitual residence, both as a jurisdictional criterion (Art. 1) and as a connecting factor (Art. 2). Nationality is a secondary criterion, subject to the condition that the intervention of national authorities is required by the best interests of the child (Art. 4). In the Convention on child protection of 1996, the only reference to the child's nationality is found in a list of fora that might be better placed to assess the best interests of the child: Art. 8(2). The Convention on the international protection of adults, concluded in 2000, contains similar provisions in Arts. 7 and 8. In the Conventions on maintenance obligations of 1956 and 1973, and in the Protocol of 2007, nationality plays a minor role in alternative reference rules favoring either the creditor (Art. 5 of the 1973 Convention, Art. 4(4) of the Protocol), or the debtor (Art. 6 Protocol). In the Convention on matrimonial property regimes of 1978, the primary connecting factor refers to the state in which both spouses establish their first habitual residence after marriage. By way of exception, Art. 4(2) refers to the national law of the spouses if a complex set of conditions are met, which, in combination, require that all states involved adhere to the nationality principle. As far as adoption is concerned, nationality was a prominent feature of the 1965 Convention. Not a single reference to this criterion can be found in the Convention on inter-country adoption of 1993.
65. In the area of divorce, for instance, the primary reference is either to the lex fori (Switzerland, Art. 61(1) IPRG, supra n. 60; the Netherlands, Art. 56 of the bill on the adoption of Book 10 Civil Code), or to the domiciliary law (Art. 55(1) Belgian Code, supra n. 60). In the latest draft of the so-called 'Rome III Regulation', a controversial attempt to formulate European choice-of-law rules for divorce and separation, the primary reference is to the law of the spouses' (last) common habitual residence. The common nationality of the spouses is not taken into account unless they have no common habitual residence at the start of the proceedings or a last common habitual residence in a country where one of the spouses still resides.
66. Under Art. 12 of the Convention relating to the status of refugees (Geneva, 1951) , domicile is substituted for nationality with regard to all status issues. In many jurisdictions, the problem of dual nationality is solved by giving precedence to the nationality of the forum state, or to the nationality of the state of residence. With regard to states with more than one legal system, the most common solution first refers to the interregional law of the state concerned; in the absence thereof, to the 'territorial unit' within that country with which a person is most closely connected, notably their home state. If such a connection cannot be established, nationality must yield to a domiciliary factor. All these solutions tend to reduce the traditional dominance of the nationality principle. NILR 2010
3.2
Diverging methods: neo-statutism and the quest for substantive justice Set against these converging trends, which could all be fitted into the mold of Savignian jurisdiction-selection, there was considerably less agreement on the validity of the allocation method itself. Throughout the twentieth century, attempts were made to come up with a viable alternative, in which 'Savigny's blindfold' 67 would be removed and account could be taken of substantive policies and legislative intent. In essence, all these theories revert to a statutist point of departure: the applicability of conflicting laws is determined by their spatial reach. Among the early proponents of a neo-statutist approach was Antoine Pillet, positing that a distinction between lois de protection individuelle and lois de garantie sociale ou d'ordre public' would reveal their territorial or extraterritorial reach.
68 Other neo-statutists advocated various methods based on unilateral conflicts rules: if each state would explicitly demarcate the spatial reach of its substantive laws, conflicts could be readily solved by the elimination of any law that does not declare itself applicable. 69 The direct impact of these proposals on legislation and jurisprudence has been minimal. 70 However, they may have helped to pave the way for several 'policy-oriented approaches' that did shake the foundations of conflicts theory. In the United States, the allocation method was replaced or complemented by Currie's 'governmental interest analysis', Leflar's 'choice-influencing considerations', Cavers' 'principles of preference', or Baxter's 'comparative impairment approach', all based on an appraisal of the contents and scope of the eligible rules of decision. 71 In Europe, the neo-statutist 67. The metaphor comes from J.E.J.Th. Deelen, De blinddoek van Von Savigny, inaugural lecture Tilburg (Amsterdam, Scheltema & Holkema N.V. 1966) .
68. Pillet, supra n. 37, pp. 250 et seq. An attempt to integrate Pillet's ideas on the 'social function of legal norms' into a 'functional choice-of-law method' was made by L.I. de Winter, 'De sociale functies der rechtsnormen als grondslag voor de oplossing van internationaal privaatrechtelijke wetsconflicten ', Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis (1947 ) pp. 101-177, reprinted in Naar een sociaal I.P.R., een keus uit het werk van L.I. de Winter (Deventer, Kluwer 1979 69. Among the proponents of a system of unilateral conflicts rules were, e.g., J. Cours (2002) pp. 9-448. NILR 2010 theory was less influential, but it did result in the canonization of the doctrine of 'overriding mandatory rules' and in some forms of policy-oriented allocation.
In the context of this article, there is no need to describe these developments in detail. Initially, a new generation of conflicts scholars, dissatisfied with mechanical, inflexible rules, set great store by the fresh approach laid open by Currie and his kindred spirits. In Europe, in the 1970s and 1980s, interest analysis was hotly debated, a sure sign that it was considered by some as a viable alternative to the allocation method, by others as a serious threat to the universalist ideals they still cherished. 72 With hindsight, we can now safely say that the conservatives need not have worried. The American 'conflicts revolution' has resulted in methodological chaos, 73 spawning a fresh need for workable rules, clear-cut principles and predictable results. Apart from the conflicts rules laid down in the Restatement Second on Conflict of Laws, there are now codifications and state statutes on choice of law offering the kind of directions that were missing in the 'approaches' advocated by the theorists. To the extent that such rules are couched in an open-ended formula, followed by a list of geographical factors to be taken into account, they closely resemble the European version of flexible conflicts rules, which are either based on a presumption of the closest connection, or subject to a general or specific 'proper law exception'. Where they reflect the basic policy underlying a particular field of law -or where such policy should be taken into account under a general choice-of-law principle -they come close to the 'policy-oriented choice-of-law rules' laid down in various European regulations and codifications. A concern for the weaker party, for instance, is now reflected in both American and European conflicts legislation. 74 'Better law' considerations are at the root of alternative reference rules now current in Europe and elsewhere, NILR 2010 such as the provision on environmental torts in the Rome II Regulation or Article 4 of the Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance obligations. In short, the dissatisfaction with traditional choice of law may have caused a methodological revolution in the United States, but it did not fail to affect the development of choice of law in other jurisdictions, especially in Europe, even if they remained faithful to traditional choice-of-law conceptions. Their conflicts rules no longer depend on abstract geographical factors alone. There is room for flexibility in the designation of the applicable law. Substantive values and policies have been translated into connecting factors focusing on the weaker party, or into alternative reference rules favoring a specific substantive result. These changes can be attributed, I think, to the reverberations the American conflicts revolution had in the rest of the world. In this perspective, it could be argued that methodological differences are gradually being bridged by consensus on the tools of modern choice of law: flexible criteria to determine the closest connection on the one hand, and some way to take account of legislative policies on the other.
3.3
The limits of comity: public interests
An assessment of legislative intent is, of course, at the heart of a doctrine that has found its way into recent European conflicts legislation, usually under such headings as: overriding mandatory rules, Eingriffsnormen, lois de police, norme di applicazione necessaria, or voorrangsregels. Such rules should be applied, irrespective of the law designated by the forum's conflicts rule, if their application will actually further the public interests of one of the states involved. 75 Stated in this way, the doctrine could even contribute to the achievement of decisional harmony: if all states involved would be prepared to take account of another state's public interests by allowing that state's mandatory rules to take precedence over the otherwise applicable law, the outcome could be the same in every forum.
76 However, few states are that generous. The Rome Convention of 1980 already made a distinction between mandatory rules of the forum -whose application 'nothing in this Convention shall restrict' -and foreign rules that 'may 75. Cf. Art. 9(1) Rome I Regulation: 'Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situa tion falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.' 76. In its celebrated Alnati decision (Hoge Raad 13 May 1966 , NJ 1967 , the Dutch Supreme Court endorsed a multilateral variant of the doctrine: all rules protecting public interests, whether foreign or domestic, qualify as overriding mandatory rules; forum rules are not in any way privileged. However, when the Court had an opportunity to put its theory into practice, it completely ignored the foreign public interests at stake (Surinam's interest in the application of its currency regulation to a real estate transaction in the Netherlands Antilles) and Dutch Antillean law was applied as lex rei sitae: Hoge Raad 12 January 1979 , NJ 1980 . NILR 2010 be given effect' if certain conditions are met.
77 Similar distinctions can be found in national conflicts statutes. 78 In recent European Regulations, the scope of the doctrine has been limited even more. 79 Such parochialism is hardly in tune with the universalist ideal of achieving uniform results. Yet, even Savigny acknowledged the existence of 'laws of a strictly positive, imperative nature', meant to protect the public interests of the forum state and therefore unfit to be subjected to an allocation process that is necessarily blind to state interests. 80 The doctrine of overriding mandatory rules may defeat the achievement of decisional harmony, but as a means of protecting overriding forum interests it was and is a universally accepted feature of conflicts law. Whether cloaked in terms of territoriality, public policy, governmental interests, or Sonderanknüpfung, the protection of national public interests has always outweighed any other choice-of-law consideration. In that respect, the limits of comity have not really changed.
THE EMANCIPATION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Looking back on the developments in my field since the nineteenth century, I would say that conflicts law has emancipated itself from the bonds of comity, NILR 2010 sovereignty, territoriality and other unilateralist notions that forged a link between public and private international law. The kind of solution that depends on a classification of substantive laws according to their subject-matter, territorial reach, or social function has not won sufficient support to suppress the ascendancy of the allocation method. Nevertheless, contemporary conflicts law is not impervious to the influence of unilaterist theories. Legislative intent does play a part in the choice-of-law process where the spatial reach of forum law is delineated in a unilateral choice-of-law rule, 81 or where policies and interests must be assessed under the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules or pursuant to policy-oriented choice-of-law considerations. On an abstract level, substantive policies are taken into account in the formulation of 'functional' conflicts rules, reflecting the function of the corresponding substantive law, or alternative reference rules meant to bring about a preferred material result. Thus, on both sides of the Atlantic, the identification of the closest connection is now being combined with result-selective techniques, a methodological rapprochement that once seemed impossible 82 but now contributes to the converging trends in contemporary conflicts law.
Despite this new regard for legislative intent, multilateral conflicts rules are still the main vehicle for discovering the applicable rule of decision. Some of those rules are virtually universal, either because of their time-honored pedigree, 83 or because they meet a global need for stability and predictability in international legal intercourse. 84 Other choice-of-law rules will vary from state to state, but in view of their newly acquired flexibility, the localizing factors that ultimately tip the scales may still be the same in all jurisdictions concerned. This is not to say that decisional harmony will be achieved in such cases -the ultimate choice could well lead to the application of forum law -but there can be no mistake that the methodological turmoil of the past decades has now subsided and that we are again moving towards a universal conception of conflicts law. A worldwide consensus is growing on its methods, objectives, doctrines and criteria, fostered by an unprecedented international exchange of knowledge and experience on the one hand, and the ongoing globalization on the other. 82. Cf. Symeonides, supra n. 71, p. 373, with regard to the popular assumption that unilateralism cannot coexist with multilateralism: '… such coexistence is entirely possible. This is true in codified conflicts systems where unilateral rules are surrounded by multilateral rules. It is also true in the United States, where multilateralism and unilateralism cohabit within the confines of each of several modern choice-of-law approaches, and where unilateral state statutes are becoming commonplace.' 83. Particularly: the locus regit actum rule on the formal validity of legal transactions, the lex rei sitae rule for issues regarding real property, the lex fori rule for procedural matters.
84. The most obvious examples are: the rules on party autonomy in the area of contracts, the rules giving expression to the favor negotii (rule of validation), the lex loci delicti rule (usually coinciding with the lex loci damni) and the common-domicile rule for torts. NILR 2010 Yet, converging trends in the development of national conflicts laws, or international agreement on doctrines and rules, cannot restore the alliance that once existed between public and private international law. First of all, the choice-of-law perspective has shifted from the vindication of sovereign rights to the facilitation of international legal transactions between private parties. 85 Conflicts law is no longer focused on the extent of legislative jurisdiction, which is essentially a matter of public law. Its subjects are private parties, and private law relationships are its subject-matter. Secondly: even if we are heading towards a consensus communis populorum regarding the basic precepts of conflicts law, the opinio juris that turns such agreement into law would still be lacking. 86 In today's world, it is inconceivable that one state would accuse another of violating a conflicts rule or principle that has been adopted everywhere else, unless the opposing states are bound by treaty. 87 The fact that a rule has been adopted by a great majority of states does not turn it into a rule of international law. As long as states do not feel mutually obliged to abide by the rules they have in common, they are free to abolish them or to replace them with different rules. We may have come much closer to the völkerrechtlichte Gemeinschaft in which Savigny put his hope for an international common law of conflicts, but I see no signs indicating that states now feel legally obliged to adapt their choice-of-law rules to commonly accepted standards, or to refrain from changing them as they see fit.
85. Cf. Juenger, supra n. 53, p. 161: '… the exigencies of international trade, rather than sovereignty, are the moving force behind our discipline'. To the extent that courts are prepared to take 'governmental interests' into account in their adjudication of conflicts cases, they are still resolving a dispute between private parties, not between states. Cf. M. Rheinstein, 'How to Review a Festschrift ', 11 American Journal of Comparative Law (1962) pp. 632-668 at p. 663: 'No state has ever appeared to be so interested in the implementation of those policies which underlie its private law that it would regard their disregard by other states as an affront to its jurisdiction or sovereignty, or as an intentional tort.' 86. Cf. Akehurst, supra n. 1, 3rd edn. p. 54; 7th edn. (Malanczuk), p. 73, writing specifically on rules of private international law: 'Similarity between the laws of different countries does not necessarily reflect a rule of public international law … it is also necessary to show an opinio iuris, a conviction that public international law requires states to incorporate the rule in question in their municipal laws. This is what is lacking.' 87. The Case concerning the application of the Convention of 1902 governing the guardianship of infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), decided by the International Court of Justice on 28 November 1958 , ICJ Reports (1958 p. 55, is a rare instance in which the Court was asked to rule on an issue of private international law. After Swedish authorities had taken a protective measure with regard to a Dutch child residing in Sweden, the Netherlands asserted that the application of Swedish law constituted a violation of the nationality principle on which the Convention was based. Recently, on 21 December 2009, Belgium instituted proceedings against Switzerland for an alleged violation of the Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments of 1988. Belgium argues that, under the Convention, Switzerland should have recognized a decision by the Belgian courts. Furthermore, Switzerland allegedly violated a rule of 'general international law' by not staying proceedings later initiated in that country on the same subject-matter. Under that general rule, Belgium asserts, 'all State authority, especially in the judicial domain, must be exercised reasonably'. NILR 2010 Thus, even if public and private international law, despite their different subjects and subject-matter, could still be seen as two branches of the same tree, they are fed by different sources, and that is what really sets them apart. In most of the world, private international law still flows from national sources, 88 the unification efforts of the Hague Conference and other international organizations notwithstanding. Apart, perhaps, from a vague notion that state authorities should take account of the international character of a private law relationship, there are no rules of international law telling us how that should be done. In that respect, conflicts law has no ties with international law. All the same, there is more that unites than separates the two disciplines. Both address problems that can only arise in a world divided by national or regional borders. Both have a universal outlook, in that their rules and principles are conceived with an open mind to the needs of the international legal order. Both are meant to contribute to the prevention and solution of cross-border conflicts, the promotion of international cooperation, and the achievement of global justice and security. Public and private international law are like an old couple living in separate homes but still united by their common history, their old ideals and shared interests, and their motivation for the same cause. Once in a while they still meet, under the auspices of institutions devoted to the study of 'international law', but those encounters only confirm that public and international law are living apart together: bound by their international outlook, but divided by their commitment to different tasks and their allegiance to different legal orbits.
